| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Prior to version 3.6.2, the publish service exposes bookmarked blocks from password-protected documents to unauthenticated visitors. In publish/read-only mode, /api/bookmark/getBookmark filters bookmark results by calling FilterBlocksByPublishAccess(nil, ...). Because the filter treats a nil context as authorized, it skips the publish password check and returns bookmarked blocks from documents configured as Protected. As a result, anyone who can access the publish service can retrieve content from protected documents without providing the required password, as long as at least one block in the document is bookmarked. This issue has been patched in version 3.6.2. |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Prior to version 3.6.2, an attacker who can place a malicious URL in an Attribute View mAsse field can trigger stored XSS when a victim opens the Gallery or Kanban view with “Cover From -> Asset Field” enabled. The vulnerable code accepts arbitrary http(s) URLs without extensions as images, stores the attacker-controlled string in coverURL, and injects it directly into an <img src="..."> attribute without escaping. In the Electron desktop client, the injected JavaScript executes with nodeIntegration enabled and contextIsolation disabled, so the XSS reaches arbitrary OS command execution under the victim’s account. This issue has been patched in version 3.6.2. |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Prior to version 3.6.2, a malicious website can achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on any desktop running SiYuan by exploiting the permissive CORS policy (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * + Access-Control-Allow-Private-Network: true) to inject a JavaScript snippet via the API. The injected snippet executes in Electron's Node.js context with full OS access the next time the user opens SiYuan's UI. No user interaction is required beyond visiting the malicious website while SiYuan is running. This issue has been patched in version 3.6.2. |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Prior to version 3.6.2, a vulnerability allows crafted block attribute values to bypass server-side attribute escaping when an HTML entity is mixed with raw special characters. An attacker can embed a malicious IAL value inside a .sy document, package it as a .sy.zip, and have the victim import it through the normal Import -> SiYuan .sy.zip workflow. Once the note is opened, the malicious attribute breaks out of its original HTML context and injects an event handler, resulting in stored XSS. In the Electron desktop client, this XSS reaches remote code execution because injected JavaScript runs with access to Node/Electron APIs. This issue has been patched in version 3.6.2. |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. From version 3.6.0 to before version 3.6.2, the SanitizeSVG function introduced in version 3.6.0 to fix XSS in the unauthenticated /api/icon/getDynamicIcon endpoint can be bypassed by using namespace-prefixed element names such as <x:script xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">. The Go HTML5 parser records the element's tag as "x:script" rather than "script", so the tag check passes it through. The SVG is served with Content-Type: image/svg+xml and no Content Security Policy; when a browser opens the response directly, its XML parser resolves the prefix to the SVG namespace and executes the embedded script. This issue has been patched in version 3.6.2. |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Prior to version 3.6.2, document IDs were retrieved via the /api/file/readDir interface, and then the /api/block/getChildBlocks interface was used to view the content of all documents. Version 3.6.2 patches the issue. |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Prior to version 3.6.2, the /api/file/readDir interface was used to traverse and retrieve the file names of all documents under a notebook. Version 3.6.2 patches the issue. |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, POST /api/import/importStdMd passes the localPath parameter directly to model.ImportFromLocalPath with zero path validation. The function recursively reads every file under the given path and permanently stores their content as SiYuan note documents in the workspace database, making them searchable and accessible to all workspace users. Data persists in the workspace database across restarts and is accessible to Publish Service Reader accounts. Combined with the renderSprig SQL injection ( separate advisory ), a non-admin user can then read all imported secrets without any additional privileges. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1. |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Prior to version 3.6.2, the `IsSensitivePath()` function in `kernel/util/path.go` uses a denylist approach that was recently expanded (GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6, commit 9914fd1) but remains incomplete. Multiple security-relevant Linux directories are not blocked, including `/opt` (application data), `/usr` (local configs/binaries), `/home` (other users), `/mnt` and `/media` (mounted volumes). The `globalCopyFiles` and `importStdMd` endpoints rely on `IsSensitivePath` as their primary defense against reading files outside the workspace. Version 3.6.2 contains an updated fix. |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Prior to version 3.6.2, the SiYuan kernel WebSocket server accepts unauthenticated connections when a specific "auth keepalive" query parameter is present. After connection, incoming messages are parsed using unchecked type assertions on attacker-controlled JSON. A remote attacker can send malformed messages that trigger a runtime panic, potentially crashing the kernel process and causing denial of service. Version 3.6.2 fixes the issue. |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Prior to version 3.6.2, the Siyuan kernel exposes an unauthenticated file-serving endpoint under `/appearance/*filepath.` Due to improper path sanitization, attackers can perform directory traversal and read arbitrary files accessible to the server process. Authentication checks explicitly exclude this endpoint, allowing exploitation without valid credentials. Version 3.6.2 fixes this issue. |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the backend renderREADME function uses lute.New() without calling SetSanitize(true), allowing raw HTML embedded in Markdown to pass through unmodified. The frontend then assigns the rendered HTML to innerHTML without any additional sanitization. A malicious package author can embed arbitrary JavaScript in their README that executes when a user clicks to view the package details. Because SiYuan's Electron configuration enables nodeIntegration: true with contextIsolation: false, this XSS escalates directly to full Remote Code Execution. The issue was patched in version 3.6.1. |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Versions 3.6.0 and below render package metadata fields (displayName, description) using template literals without HTML escaping. A malicious package author can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript into these fields, which executes automatically when any user browses the Bazaar page. Because SiYuan's Electron configuration enables nodeIntegration: true with contextIsolation: false, this XSS escalates directly to full Remote Code Execution on the victim's operating system — with zero user interaction beyond opening the marketplace tab. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1. |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Versions 3.6.0 and below contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in the /api/search/fullTextSearchBlock endpoint. When the method parameter is set to 2, the endpoint passes user-supplied input directly as a raw SQL statement to the underlying SQLite database without any authorization or read-only checks. This allows any authenticated user — including those with the Reader role — to execute arbitrary SQL statements (SELECT, DELETE, UPDATE, DROP TABLE, etc.) against the application's database. This is inconsistent with the application's own security model: the dedicated SQL endpoint (/api/query/sql) correctly requires both CheckAdminRole and CheckReadonly middleware, but the search endpoint bypasses these controls entirely. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1. |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the /api/lute/html2BlockDOM on the desktop copies local files pointed to by file:// links in pasted HTML into the workspace assets directory without validating paths against a sensitive-path list. Together with GET /assets/*path, which only requires authentication, a publish-service visitor can cause the desktop kernel to copy any readable sensitive file and then read it via GET, leading to exfiltration of sensitive files. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1. |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, SanitizeSVG has an incomplete blocklist — it blocks data:text/html and data:image/svg+xml in href attributes but misses data:text/xml and data:application/xml, both of which can render SVG with JavaScript execution. The unauthenticated /api/icon/getDynamicIcon endpoint serves user-controlled input (via the content parameter) directly into SVG markup using fmt.Sprintf with no escaping, served as Content-Type: image/svg+xml. This creates a click-through XSS: a victim navigates to a crafted URL, sees an SVG with an injected link, and clicking it triggers JavaScript via the bypassed MIME types. The attack requires direct navigation to the endpoint or <object>/<embed> embedding, since <img> tag rendering in the frontend doesn't allow interactive links. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1. |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the globalCopyFiles API eads source files using filepath.Abs() with no workspace boundary check, relying solely on util.IsSensitivePath() whose blocklist omits /proc/, /run/secrets/, and home directory dotfiles. An admin can copy /proc/1/environ or Docker secrets into the workspace and read them via the standard file API. An admin can exfiltrate any file readable by the SiYuan process that falls outside the incomplete blocklist. In containerized deployments this includes all injected secrets and environment variables - a common pattern for passing credentials to containers. The exfiltrated files are then accessible via the standard workspace file API and persist until manually deleted. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1. |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, POST /api/import/importSY and POST /api/import/importZipMd write uploaded archives to a path derived from the multipart filename field without sanitization, allowing an admin to write files to arbitrary locations outside the temp directory - including system paths that enable RCE. This can lead to aata destruction by overwriting workspace or application files, and for Docker containers running as root (common default), this grants full container compromise. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1. |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the mobile file tree (MobileFiles.ts) renders notebook names via innerHTML without HTML escaping when processing renamenotebook WebSocket events. The desktop version (Files.ts) properly uses escapeHtml() for the same operation. An authenticated user who can rename notebooks can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes on any mobile client viewing the file tree. Since Electron is configured with nodeIntegration: true and contextIsolation: false, the injected JavaScript has full Node.js access, escalating stored XSS to full remote code execution. The mobile layout is also used in the Electron desktop app when the window is narrow, making this exploitable on desktop as well. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1. |
| SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the WebSocket endpoint (/ws) allows unauthenticated connections when specific URL parameters are provided (?app=siyuan&id=auth&type=auth). This bypass, intended for the login page to keep the kernel alive, allows any external client — including malicious websites via cross-origin WebSocket — to connect and receive all server push events in real-time. These events leak sensitive document metadata including document titles, notebook names, file paths, and all CRUD operations performed by authenticated users. Combined with the absence of Origin header validation, a malicious website can silently connect to a victim's local SiYuan instance and monitor their note-taking activity. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1. |
