| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: em28xx: fix use-after-free in em28xx_v4l2_open()
em28xx_v4l2_open() reads dev->v4l2 without holding dev->lock,
creating a race with em28xx_v4l2_init()'s error path and
em28xx_v4l2_fini(), both of which free the em28xx_v4l2 struct
and set dev->v4l2 to NULL under dev->lock.
This race leads to two issues:
- use-after-free in v4l2_fh_init() when accessing vdev->ctrl_handler,
since the video_device is embedded in the freed em28xx_v4l2 struct.
- NULL pointer dereference in em28xx_resolution_set() when accessing
v4l2->norm, since dev->v4l2 has been set to NULL.
Fix this by moving the mutex_lock() before the dev->v4l2 read and
adding a NULL check for dev->v4l2 under the lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: 6fire: fix use-after-free on disconnect
In usb6fire_chip_abort(), the chip struct is allocated as the card's
private data (via snd_card_new with sizeof(struct sfire_chip)). When
snd_card_free_when_closed() is called and no file handles are open, the
card and embedded chip are freed synchronously. The subsequent
chip->card = NULL write then hits freed slab memory.
Call trace:
usb6fire_chip_abort sound/usb/6fire/chip.c:59 [inline]
usb6fire_chip_disconnect+0x348/0x358 sound/usb/6fire/chip.c:182
usb_unbind_interface+0x1a8/0x88c drivers/usb/core/driver.c:458
...
hub_event+0x1a04/0x4518 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5953
Fix by moving the card lifecycle out of usb6fire_chip_abort() and into
usb6fire_chip_disconnect(). The card pointer is saved in a local
before any teardown, snd_card_disconnect() is called first to prevent
new opens, URBs are aborted while chip is still valid, and
snd_card_free_when_closed() is called last so chip is never accessed
after the card may be freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: fix integer underflow in chain mode
The jumbo_frm() chain-mode implementation unconditionally computes
len = nopaged_len - bmax;
where nopaged_len = skb_headlen(skb) (linear bytes only) and bmax is
BUF_SIZE_8KiB or BUF_SIZE_2KiB. However, the caller stmmac_xmit()
decides to invoke jumbo_frm() based on skb->len (total length including
page fragments):
is_jumbo = stmmac_is_jumbo_frm(priv, skb->len, enh_desc);
When a packet has a small linear portion (nopaged_len <= bmax) but a
large total length due to page fragments (skb->len > bmax), the
subtraction wraps as an unsigned integer, producing a huge len value
(~0xFFFFxxxx). This causes the while (len != 0) loop to execute
hundreds of thousands of iterations, passing skb->data + bmax * i
pointers far beyond the skb buffer to dma_map_single(). On IOMMU-less
SoCs (the typical deployment for stmmac), this maps arbitrary kernel
memory to the DMA engine, constituting a kernel memory disclosure and
potential memory corruption from hardware.
Fix this by introducing a buf_len local variable clamped to
min(nopaged_len, bmax). Computing len = nopaged_len - buf_len is then
always safe: it is zero when the linear portion fits within a single
descriptor, causing the while (len != 0) loop to be skipped naturally,
and the fragment loop in stmmac_xmit() handles page fragments afterward. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bcache: fix cached_dev.sb_bio use-after-free and crash
In our production environment, we have received multiple crash reports
regarding libceph, which have caught our attention:
```
[6888366.280350] Call Trace:
[6888366.280452] blk_update_request+0x14e/0x370
[6888366.280561] blk_mq_end_request+0x1a/0x130
[6888366.280671] rbd_img_handle_request+0x1a0/0x1b0 [rbd]
[6888366.280792] rbd_obj_handle_request+0x32/0x40 [rbd]
[6888366.280903] __complete_request+0x22/0x70 [libceph]
[6888366.281032] osd_dispatch+0x15e/0xb40 [libceph]
[6888366.281164] ? inet_recvmsg+0x5b/0xd0
[6888366.281272] ? ceph_tcp_recvmsg+0x6f/0xa0 [libceph]
[6888366.281405] ceph_con_process_message+0x79/0x140 [libceph]
[6888366.281534] ceph_con_v1_try_read+0x5d7/0xf30 [libceph]
[6888366.281661] ceph_con_workfn+0x329/0x680 [libceph]
```
After analyzing the coredump file, we found that the address of
dc->sb_bio has been freed. We know that cached_dev is only freed when it
is stopped.
Since sb_bio is a part of struct cached_dev, rather than an alloc every
time. If the device is stopped while writing to the superblock, the
released address will be accessed at endio.
This patch hopes to wait for sb_write to complete in cached_dev_free.
It should be noted that we analyzed the cause of the problem, then tell
all details to the QWEN and adopted the modifications it made. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wireguard: device: use exit_rtnl callback instead of manual rtnl_lock in pre_exit
wg_netns_pre_exit() manually acquires rtnl_lock() inside the
pernet .pre_exit callback. This causes a hung task when another
thread holds rtnl_mutex - the cleanup_net workqueue (or the
setup_net failure rollback path) blocks indefinitely in
wg_netns_pre_exit() waiting to acquire the lock.
Convert to .exit_rtnl, introduced in commit 7a60d91c690b ("net:
Add ->exit_rtnl() hook to struct pernet_operations."), where the
framework already holds RTNL and batches all callbacks under a
single rtnl_lock()/rtnl_unlock() pair, eliminating the contention
window.
The rcu_assign_pointer(wg->creating_net, NULL) is safe to move
from .pre_exit to .exit_rtnl (which runs after synchronize_rcu())
because all RCU readers of creating_net either use maybe_get_net()
- which returns NULL for a dying namespace with zero refcount - or
access net->user_ns which remains valid throughout the entire
ops_undo_list sequence.
[ Jason: added __net_exit and __read_mostly annotations that were missing. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: as102: fix to not free memory after the device is registered in as102_usb_probe()
In as102_usb driver, the following race condition occurs:
```
CPU0 CPU1
as102_usb_probe()
kzalloc(); // alloc as102_dev_t
....
usb_register_dev();
fd = sys_open("/path/to/dev"); // open as102 fd
....
usb_deregister_dev();
....
kfree(); // free as102_dev_t
....
sys_close(fd);
as102_release() // UAF!!
as102_usb_release()
kfree(); // DFB!!
```
When a USB character device registered with usb_register_dev() is later
unregistered (via usb_deregister_dev() or disconnect), the device node is
removed so new open() calls fail. However, file descriptors that are
already open do not go away immediately: they remain valid until the last
reference is dropped and the driver's .release() is invoked.
In as102, as102_usb_probe() calls usb_register_dev() and then, on an
error path, does usb_deregister_dev() and frees as102_dev_t right away.
If userspace raced a successful open() before the deregistration, that
open FD will later hit as102_release() --> as102_usb_release() and access
or free as102_dev_t again, occur a race to use-after-free and
double-free vuln.
The fix is to never kfree(as102_dev_t) directly once usb_register_dev()
has succeeded. After deregistration, defer freeing memory to .release().
In other words, let release() perform the last kfree when the final open
FD is closed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: fix NULL i_assoc_inode dereference in nilfs_mdt_save_to_shadow_map
The DAT inode's btree node cache (i_assoc_inode) is initialized lazily
during btree operations. However, nilfs_mdt_save_to_shadow_map()
assumes i_assoc_inode is already initialized when copying dirty pages
to the shadow map during GC.
If NILFS_IOCTL_CLEAN_SEGMENTS is called immediately after mount before
any btree operation has occurred on the DAT inode, i_assoc_inode is
NULL leading to a general protection fault.
Fix this by calling nilfs_attach_btree_node_cache() on the DAT inode
in nilfs_dat_read() at mount time, ensuring i_assoc_inode is always
initialized before any GC operation can use it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: sm750fb: fix division by zero in ps_to_hz()
ps_to_hz() is called from hw_sm750_crtc_set_mode() without validating
that pixclock is non-zero. A zero pixclock passed via FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO
causes a division by zero.
Fix by rejecting zero pixclock in lynxfb_ops_check_var(), consistent
with other framebuffer drivers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/mm: Add missing secure storage access fixups for donated memory
There are special cases where secure storage access exceptions happen
in a kernel context for pages that don't have the PG_arch_1 bit
set. That bit is set for non-exported guest secure storage (memory)
but is absent on storage donated to the Ultravisor since the kernel
isn't allowed to export donated pages.
Prior to this patch we would try to export the page by calling
arch_make_folio_accessible() which would instantly return since the
arch bit is absent signifying that the page was already exported and
no further action is necessary. This leads to secure storage access
exception loops which can never be resolved.
With this patch we unconditionally try to export and if that fails we
fixup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: KVM: Handle the case that EIOINTC's coremap is empty
EIOINTC's coremap in eiointc_update_sw_coremap() can be empty, currently
we get a cpuid with -1 in this case, but we actually need 0 because it's
similar as the case that cpuid >= 4.
This fix an out-of-bounds access to kvm_arch::phyid_map::phys_map[]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: gw: fix OOB heap access in cgw_csum_crc8_rel()
cgw_csum_crc8_rel() correctly computes bounds-safe indices via calc_idx():
int from = calc_idx(crc8->from_idx, cf->len);
int to = calc_idx(crc8->to_idx, cf->len);
int res = calc_idx(crc8->result_idx, cf->len);
if (from < 0 || to < 0 || res < 0)
return;
However, the loop and the result write then use the raw s8 fields directly
instead of the computed variables:
for (i = crc8->from_idx; ...) /* BUG: raw negative index */
cf->data[crc8->result_idx] = ...; /* BUG: raw negative index */
With from_idx = to_idx = result_idx = -64 on a 64-byte CAN FD frame,
calc_idx(-64, 64) = 0 so the guard passes, but the loop iterates with
i = -64, reading cf->data[-64], and the write goes to cf->data[-64].
This write might end up to 56 (7.0-rc) or 40 (<= 6.19) bytes before the
start of the canfd_frame on the heap.
The companion function cgw_csum_xor_rel() uses `from`/`to`/`res`
correctly throughout; fix cgw_csum_crc8_rel() to match.
Confirmed with KASAN on linux-7.0-rc2:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cgw_csum_crc8_rel+0x515/0x5b0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880076619c8 by task poc_cgw_oob/62
To configure the can-gw crc8 checksums CAP_NET_ADMIN is needed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix buffer overread in rxgk_do_verify_authenticator()
Fix rxgk_do_verify_authenticator() to check the buffer size before checking
the nonce. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix leak of rxgk context in rxgk_verify_response()
Fix rxgk_verify_response() to clean up the rxgk context it creates. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: reject undecryptable rxkad response tickets
rxkad_decrypt_ticket() decrypts the RXKAD response ticket and then
parses the buffer as plaintext without checking whether
crypto_skcipher_decrypt() succeeded.
A malformed RESPONSE can therefore use a non-block-aligned ticket
length, make the decrypt operation fail, and still drive the ticket
parser with attacker-controlled bytes.
Check the decrypt result and abort the connection with RXKADBADTICKET
when ticket decryption fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lan966x: fix page pool leak in error paths
lan966x_fdma_rx_alloc() creates a page pool but does not destroy it if
the subsequent fdma_alloc_coherent() call fails, leaking the pool.
Similarly, lan966x_fdma_init() frees the coherent DMA memory when
lan966x_fdma_tx_alloc() fails but does not destroy the page pool that
was successfully created by lan966x_fdma_rx_alloc(), leaking it.
Add the missing page_pool_destroy() calls in both error paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: filemap: fix nr_pages calculation overflow in filemap_map_pages()
When running stress-ng on my Arm64 machine with v7.0-rc3 kernel, I
encountered some very strange crash issues showing up as "Bad page state":
"
[ 734.496287] BUG: Bad page state in process stress-ng-env pfn:415735fb
[ 734.496427] page: refcount:0 mapcount:1 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x4cf316 pfn:0x415735fb
[ 734.496434] flags: 0x57fffe000000800(owner_2|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3ffff)
[ 734.496439] raw: 057fffe000000800 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
[ 734.496440] raw: 00000000004cf316 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 734.496442] page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
"
After analyzing this page’s state, it is hard to understand why the
mapcount is not 0 while the refcount is 0, since this page is not where
the issue first occurred. By enabling the CONFIG_DEBUG_VM config, I can
reproduce the crash as well and captured the first warning where the issue
appears:
"
[ 734.469226] page: refcount:33 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000bef2d187 index:0x81a0 pfn:0x415735c0
[ 734.469304] head: order:5 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
[ 734.469315] memcg:ffff000807a8ec00
[ 734.469320] aops:ext4_da_aops ino:100b6f dentry name(?):"stress-ng-mmaptorture-9397-0-2736200540"
[ 734.469335] flags: 0x57fffe400000069(locked|uptodate|lru|head|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3ffff)
......
[ 734.469364] page dumped because: VM_WARN_ON_FOLIO((_Generic((page + nr_pages - 1),
const struct page *: (const struct folio *)_compound_head(page + nr_pages - 1), struct page *:
(struct folio *)_compound_head(page + nr_pages - 1))) != folio)
[ 734.469390] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 734.469393] WARNING: ./include/linux/rmap.h:351 at folio_add_file_rmap_ptes+0x3b8/0x468,
CPU#90: stress-ng-mlock/9430
[ 734.469551] folio_add_file_rmap_ptes+0x3b8/0x468 (P)
[ 734.469555] set_pte_range+0xd8/0x2f8
[ 734.469566] filemap_map_folio_range+0x190/0x400
[ 734.469579] filemap_map_pages+0x348/0x638
[ 734.469583] do_fault_around+0x140/0x198
......
[ 734.469640] el0t_64_sync+0x184/0x188
"
The code that triggers the warning is: "VM_WARN_ON_FOLIO(page_folio(page +
nr_pages - 1) != folio, folio)", which indicates that set_pte_range()
tried to map beyond the large folio’s size.
By adding more debug information, I found that 'nr_pages' had overflowed
in filemap_map_pages(), causing set_pte_range() to establish mappings for
a range exceeding the folio size, potentially corrupting fields of pages
that do not belong to this folio (e.g., page->_mapcount).
After above analysis, I think the possible race is as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
filemap_map_pages() ext4_setattr()
//get and lock folio with old inode->i_size
next_uptodate_folio()
.......
//shrink the inode->i_size
i_size_write(inode, attr->ia_size);
//calculate the end_pgoff with the new inode->i_size
file_end = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(mapping->host), PAGE_SIZE) - 1;
end_pgoff = min(end_pgoff, file_end);
......
//nr_pages can be overflowed, cause xas.xa_index > end_pgoff
end = folio_next_index(folio) - 1;
nr_pages = min(end, end_pgoff) - xas.xa_index + 1;
......
//map large folio
filemap_map_folio_range()
......
//truncate folios
truncate_pagecache(inode, inode->i_size);
To fix this issue, move the 'end_pgoff' calculation before
next_uptodate_folio(), so the retrieved folio stays consistent with the
file end to avoid
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: vub300: fix use-after-free on disconnect
The vub300 driver maintains an explicit reference count for the
controller and its driver data and the last reference can in theory be
dropped after the driver has been unbound.
This specifically means that the controller allocation must not be
device managed as that can lead to use-after-free.
Note that the lifetime is currently also incorrectly tied the parent USB
device rather than interface, which can lead to memory leaks if the
driver is unbound without its device being physically disconnected (e.g.
on probe deferral).
Fix both issues by reverting to non-managed allocation of the controller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: vub300: fix NULL-deref on disconnect
Make sure to deregister the controller before dropping the reference to
the driver data on disconnect to avoid NULL-pointer dereferences or
use-after-free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: hold claim backbone gateways by reference
batadv_bla_add_claim() can replace claim->backbone_gw and drop the old
gateway's last reference while readers still follow the pointer.
The netlink claim dump path dereferences claim->backbone_gw->orig and
takes claim->backbone_gw->crc_lock without pinning the underlying
backbone gateway. batadv_bla_check_claim() still has the same naked
pointer access pattern.
Reuse batadv_bla_claim_get_backbone_gw() in both readers so they operate
on a stable gateway reference until the read-side work is complete.
This keeps the dump and claim-check paths aligned with the lifetime
rules introduced for the other BLA claim readers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915: Unlink NV12 planes earlier
unlink_nv12_plane() will clobber parts of the plane state
potentially already set up by plane_atomic_check(), so we
must make sure not to call the two in the wrong order.
The problem happens when a plane previously selected as
a Y plane is now configured as a normal plane by user space.
plane_atomic_check() will first compute the proper plane
state based on the userspace request, and unlink_nv12_plane()
later clears some of the state.
This used to work on account of unlink_nv12_plane() skipping
the state clearing based on the plane visibility. But I removed
that check, thinking it was an impossible situation. Now when
that situation happens unlink_nv12_plane() will just WARN
and proceed to clobber the state.
Rather than reverting to the old way of doing things, I think
it's more clear if we unlink the NV12 planes before we even
compute the new plane state.
(cherry picked from commit 017ecd04985573eeeb0745fa2c23896fb22ee0cc) |
