| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/s390: Fix memory corruption when using identity domain
zpci_get_iommu_ctrs() returns counter information to be reported as part
of device statistics; these counters are stored as part of the s390_domain.
The problem, however, is that the identity domain is not backed by an
s390_domain and so the conversion via to_s390_domain() yields a bad address
that is zero'd initially and read on-demand later via a sysfs read.
These counters aren't necessary for the identity domain; just return NULL
in this case.
This issue was discovered via KASAN with reports that look like:
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in zpci_fmb_enable_device
when using the identity domain for a device on s390. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: smbdirect: verify remaining_data_length respects max_fragmented_recv_size
This is inspired by the check for data_offset + data_length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: smbdirect: validate data_offset and data_length field of smb_direct_data_transfer
If data_offset and data_length of smb_direct_data_transfer struct are
invalid, out of bounds issue could happen.
This patch validate data_offset and data_length field in recv_done. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-pf: Fix use-after-free bugs in otx2_sync_tstamp()
The original code relies on cancel_delayed_work() in otx2_ptp_destroy(),
which does not ensure that the delayed work item synctstamp_work has fully
completed if it was already running. This leads to use-after-free scenarios
where otx2_ptp is deallocated by otx2_ptp_destroy(), while synctstamp_work
remains active and attempts to dereference otx2_ptp in otx2_sync_tstamp().
Furthermore, the synctstamp_work is cyclic, the likelihood of triggering
the bug is nonnegligible.
A typical race condition is illustrated below:
CPU 0 (cleanup) | CPU 1 (delayed work callback)
otx2_remove() |
otx2_ptp_destroy() | otx2_sync_tstamp()
cancel_delayed_work() |
kfree(ptp) |
| ptp = container_of(...); //UAF
| ptp-> //UAF
This is confirmed by a KASAN report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88800aa09a18 by task bash/136
...
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70
print_report+0xcf/0x610
? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0
? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
__run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
? __pfx___run_timer_base.part.0+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_read_tsc+0x10/0x10
? ktime_get+0x60/0x140
? lapic_next_event+0x11/0x20
? clockevents_program_event+0x1d4/0x2a0
run_timer_softirq+0xd1/0x190
handle_softirqs+0x16a/0x550
irq_exit_rcu+0xaf/0xe0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x80
</IRQ>
...
Allocated by task 1:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90
otx2_ptp_init+0xb1/0x860
otx2_probe+0x4eb/0xc30
local_pci_probe+0xdc/0x190
pci_device_probe+0x2fe/0x470
really_probe+0x1ca/0x5c0
__driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310
driver_probe_device+0x44/0x120
__driver_attach+0xd2/0x310
bus_for_each_dev+0xed/0x170
bus_add_driver+0x208/0x500
driver_register+0x132/0x460
do_one_initcall+0x89/0x300
kernel_init_freeable+0x40d/0x720
kernel_init+0x1a/0x150
ret_from_fork+0x10c/0x1a0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Freed by task 136:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3a/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x3f/0x50
kfree+0x137/0x370
otx2_ptp_destroy+0x38/0x80
otx2_remove+0x10d/0x4c0
pci_device_remove+0xa6/0x1d0
device_release_driver_internal+0xf8/0x210
pci_stop_bus_device+0x105/0x150
pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x15/0x30
remove_store+0xcc/0xe0
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x2c3/0x440
vfs_write+0x871/0xd70
ksys_write+0xee/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0xac/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
...
Replace cancel_delayed_work() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() to ensure
that the delayed work item is properly canceled before the otx2_ptp is
deallocated.
This bug was initially identified through static analysis. To reproduce
and test it, I simulated the OcteonTX2 PCI device in QEMU and introduced
artificial delays within the otx2_sync_tstamp() function to increase the
likelihood of triggering the bug. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: make sure to abort the stream if headers are bogus
Normally we wait for the socket to buffer up the whole record
before we service it. If the socket has a tiny buffer, however,
we read out the data sooner, to prevent connection stalls.
Make sure that we abort the connection when we find out late
that the record is actually invalid. Retrying the parsing is
fine in itself but since we copy some more data each time
before we parse we can overflow the allocated skb space.
Constructing a scenario in which we're under pressure without
enough data in the socket to parse the length upfront is quite
hard. syzbot figured out a way to do this by serving us the header
in small OOB sends, and then filling in the recvbuf with a large
normal send.
Make sure that tls_rx_msg_size() aborts strp, if we reach
an invalid record there's really no way to recover. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Harden uplink netdev access against device unbind
The function mlx5_uplink_netdev_get() gets the uplink netdevice
pointer from mdev->mlx5e_res.uplink_netdev. However, the netdevice can
be removed and its pointer cleared when unbound from the mlx5_core.eth
driver. This results in a NULL pointer, causing a kernel panic.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001300
at RIP: 0010:mlx5e_vport_rep_load+0x22a/0x270 [mlx5_core]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mlx5_esw_offloads_rep_load+0x68/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
esw_offloads_enable+0x593/0x910 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_eswitch_enable_locked+0x341/0x420 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set+0x17e/0x3a0 [mlx5_core]
devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x60/0xd0
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe0/0x130
genl_rcv_msg+0x183/0x290
netlink_rcv_skb+0x4b/0xf0
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x255/0x380
netlink_sendmsg+0x1f3/0x420
__sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60
__sys_sendto+0x119/0x180
do_syscall_64+0x53/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
Ensure the pointer is valid before use by checking it for NULL. If it
is valid, immediately call netdev_hold() to take a reference, and
preventing the netdevice from being freed while it is in use. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix Rx page leak on multi-buffer frames
The ice_put_rx_mbuf() function handles calling ice_put_rx_buf() for each
buffer in the current frame. This function was introduced as part of
handling multi-buffer XDP support in the ice driver.
It works by iterating over the buffers from first_desc up to 1 plus the
total number of fragments in the frame, cached from before the XDP program
was executed.
If the hardware posts a descriptor with a size of 0, the logic used in
ice_put_rx_mbuf() breaks. Such descriptors get skipped and don't get added
as fragments in ice_add_xdp_frag. Since the buffer isn't counted as a
fragment, we do not iterate over it in ice_put_rx_mbuf(), and thus we don't
call ice_put_rx_buf().
Because we don't call ice_put_rx_buf(), we don't attempt to re-use the
page or free it. This leaves a stale page in the ring, as we don't
increment next_to_alloc.
The ice_reuse_rx_page() assumes that the next_to_alloc has been incremented
properly, and that it always points to a buffer with a NULL page. Since
this function doesn't check, it will happily recycle a page over the top
of the next_to_alloc buffer, losing track of the old page.
Note that this leak only occurs for multi-buffer frames. The
ice_put_rx_mbuf() function always handles at least one buffer, so a
single-buffer frame will always get handled correctly. It is not clear
precisely why the hardware hands us descriptors with a size of 0 sometimes,
but it happens somewhat regularly with "jumbo frames" used by 9K MTU.
To fix ice_put_rx_mbuf(), we need to make sure to call ice_put_rx_buf() on
all buffers between first_desc and next_to_clean. Borrow the logic of a
similar function in i40e used for this same purpose. Use the same logic
also in ice_get_pgcnts().
Instead of iterating over just the number of fragments, use a loop which
iterates until the current index reaches to the next_to_clean element just
past the current frame. Unlike i40e, the ice_put_rx_mbuf() function does
call ice_put_rx_buf() on the last buffer of the frame indicating the end of
packet.
For non-linear (multi-buffer) frames, we need to take care when adjusting
the pagecnt_bias. An XDP program might release fragments from the tail of
the frame, in which case that fragment page is already released. Only
update the pagecnt_bias for the first descriptor and fragments still
remaining post-XDP program. Take care to only access the shared info for
fragmented buffers, as this avoids a significant cache miss.
The xdp_xmit value only needs to be updated if an XDP program is run, and
only once per packet. Drop the xdp_xmit pointer argument from
ice_put_rx_mbuf(). Instead, set xdp_xmit in the ice_clean_rx_irq() function
directly. This avoids needing to pass the argument and avoids an extra
bit-wise OR for each buffer in the frame.
Move the increment of the ntc local variable to ensure its updated *before*
all calls to ice_get_pgcnts() or ice_put_rx_mbuf(), as the loop logic
requires the index of the element just after the current frame.
Now that we use an index pointer in the ring to identify the packet, we no
longer need to track or cache the number of fragments in the rx_ring. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gfs2: Fix use-after-free in gfs2_glock_shrink_scan
The GLF_LRU flag is checked under lru_lock in gfs2_glock_remove_from_lru() to
remove the glock from the lru list in __gfs2_glock_put().
On the shrink scan path, the same flag is cleared under lru_lock but because
of cond_resched_lock(&lru_lock) in gfs2_dispose_glock_lru(), progress on the
put side can be made without deleting the glock from the lru list.
Keep GLF_LRU across the race window opened by cond_resched_lock(&lru_lock) to
ensure correct behavior on both sides - clear GLF_LRU after list_del under
lru_lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: Fix kernel crash due to PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL
When userspace does PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, but Supm extension is not
available, the kernel crashes:
Oops - illegal instruction [#1]
[snip]
epc : set_tagged_addr_ctrl+0x112/0x15a
ra : set_tagged_addr_ctrl+0x74/0x15a
epc : ffffffff80011ace ra : ffffffff80011a30 sp : ffffffc60039be10
[snip]
status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: 0000000010a79073 cause: 0000000000000002
set_tagged_addr_ctrl+0x112/0x15a
__riscv_sys_prctl+0x352/0x73c
do_trap_ecall_u+0x17c/0x20c
andle_exception+0x150/0x15c
Fix it by checking if Supm is available. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/edid: fix info leak when failing to get panel id
Make sure to clear the transfer buffer before fetching the EDID to
avoid leaking slab data to the logs on errors that leave the buffer
unchanged. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/chrome: cros_ec_chardev: fix kernel data leak from ioctl
It is possible to peep kernel page's data by providing larger `insize`
in struct cros_ec_command[1] when invoking EC host commands.
Fix it by using zeroed memory.
[1]: https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.2/source/include/linux/platform_data/cros_ec_proto.h#L74 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: fix kernel-infoleak in nilfs_ioctl_wrap_copy()
The ioctl helper function nilfs_ioctl_wrap_copy(), which exchanges a
metadata array to/from user space, may copy uninitialized buffer regions
to user space memory for read-only ioctl commands NILFS_IOCTL_GET_SUINFO
and NILFS_IOCTL_GET_CPINFO.
This can occur when the element size of the user space metadata given by
the v_size member of the argument nilfs_argv structure is larger than the
size of the metadata element (nilfs_suinfo structure or nilfs_cpinfo
structure) on the file system side.
KMSAN-enabled kernels detect this issue as follows:
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user
include/linux/instrumented.h:121 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0xc0/0x100 lib/usercopy.c:33
instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:121 [inline]
_copy_to_user+0xc0/0x100 lib/usercopy.c:33
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:169 [inline]
nilfs_ioctl_wrap_copy+0x6fa/0xc10 fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c:99
nilfs_ioctl_get_info fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c:1173 [inline]
nilfs_ioctl+0x2402/0x4450 fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c:1290
nilfs_compat_ioctl+0x1b8/0x200 fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c:1343
__do_compat_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:968 [inline]
__se_compat_sys_ioctl+0x7dd/0x1000 fs/ioctl.c:910
__ia32_compat_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:910
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:112 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0xa2/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:178
do_fast_syscall_32+0x37/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:203
do_SYSENTER_32+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/common.c:246
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x70/0x82
Uninit was created at:
__alloc_pages+0x9f6/0xe90 mm/page_alloc.c:5572
alloc_pages+0xab0/0xd80 mm/mempolicy.c:2287
__get_free_pages+0x34/0xc0 mm/page_alloc.c:5599
nilfs_ioctl_wrap_copy+0x223/0xc10 fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c:74
nilfs_ioctl_get_info fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c:1173 [inline]
nilfs_ioctl+0x2402/0x4450 fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c:1290
nilfs_compat_ioctl+0x1b8/0x200 fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c:1343
__do_compat_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:968 [inline]
__se_compat_sys_ioctl+0x7dd/0x1000 fs/ioctl.c:910
__ia32_compat_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:910
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:112 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0xa2/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:178
do_fast_syscall_32+0x37/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:203
do_SYSENTER_32+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/common.c:246
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x70/0x82
Bytes 16-127 of 3968 are uninitialized
...
This eliminates the leak issue by initializing the page allocated as
buffer using get_zeroed_page(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: cmis_cdb: use correct rpl size in ethtool_cmis_module_poll()
rpl is passed as a pointer to ethtool_cmis_module_poll(), so the correct
size of rpl is sizeof(*rpl) which should be just 1 byte. Using the
pointer size instead can cause stack corruption:
Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: ethtool_cmis_wait_for_cond+0xf4/0x100
CPU: 72 UID: 0 PID: 4440 Comm: kworker/72:2 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.11.0 #24
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R760/04GWWM, BIOS 1.6.6 09/20/2023
Workqueue: events module_flash_fw_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
panic+0x339/0x360
? ethtool_cmis_wait_for_cond+0xf4/0x100
? __pfx_status_success+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_status_fail+0x10/0x10
__stack_chk_fail+0x10/0x10
ethtool_cmis_wait_for_cond+0xf4/0x100
ethtool_cmis_cdb_execute_cmd+0x1fc/0x330
? __pfx_status_fail+0x10/0x10
cmis_cdb_module_features_get+0x6d/0xd0
ethtool_cmis_cdb_init+0x8a/0xd0
ethtool_cmis_fw_update+0x46/0x1d0
module_flash_fw_work+0x17/0xa0
process_one_work+0x179/0x390
worker_thread+0x239/0x340
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xcc/0x100
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: fix deinitialization of firmware resources
Currently, in ath11k_ahb_fw_resources_init(), iommu domain
mapping is done only for the chipsets having fixed firmware
memory. Also, for such chipsets, mapping is done only if it
does not have TrustZone support.
During deinitialization, only if TrustZone support is not there,
iommu is unmapped back. However, for non fixed firmware memory
chipsets, TrustZone support is not there and this makes the
condition check to true and it tries to unmap the memory which
was not mapped during initialization.
This leads to the following trace -
[ 83.198790] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008
[ 83.259537] Modules linked in: ath11k_ahb ath11k qmi_helpers
.. snip ..
[ 83.280286] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 83.287228] pc : __iommu_unmap+0x30/0x140
[ 83.293907] lr : iommu_unmap+0x5c/0xa4
[ 83.298072] sp : ffff80000b3abad0
.. snip ..
[ 83.369175] Call trace:
[ 83.376282] __iommu_unmap+0x30/0x140
[ 83.378541] iommu_unmap+0x5c/0xa4
[ 83.382360] ath11k_ahb_fw_resource_deinit.part.12+0x2c/0xac [ath11k_ahb]
[ 83.385666] ath11k_ahb_free_resources+0x140/0x17c [ath11k_ahb]
[ 83.392521] ath11k_ahb_shutdown+0x34/0x40 [ath11k_ahb]
[ 83.398248] platform_shutdown+0x20/0x2c
[ 83.403455] device_shutdown+0x16c/0x1c4
[ 83.407621] kernel_restart_prepare+0x34/0x3c
[ 83.411529] kernel_restart+0x14/0x74
[ 83.415781] __do_sys_reboot+0x1c4/0x22c
[ 83.419427] __arm64_sys_reboot+0x1c/0x24
[ 83.423420] invoke_syscall+0x44/0xfc
[ 83.427326] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xac/0xe8
[ 83.430974] do_el0_svc+0xa0/0xa8
[ 83.435659] el0_svc+0x1c/0x44
[ 83.438957] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x60/0x144
[ 83.441910] el0t_64_sync+0x15c/0x160
[ 83.446343] Code: aa0103f4 f9400001 f90027a1 d2800001 (f94006a0)
[ 83.449903] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
This can be reproduced by probing an AHB chipset which is not
having a fixed memory region. During reboot (or rmmod) trace
can be seen.
Fix this issue by adding a condition check on firmware fixed memory
hw_param as done in the counter initialization function.
Tested-on: IPQ8074 hw2.0 AHB WLAN.HK.2.7.0.1-01744-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Use raw_smp_processor_id() instead of smp_processor_id()
The following call trace was observed:
localhost kernel: nvme nvme0: NVME-FC{0}: controller connect complete
localhost kernel: BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: kworker/u129:4/75092
localhost kernel: nvme nvme0: NVME-FC{0}: new ctrl: NQN "nqn.1992-08.com.netapp:sn.b42d198afb4d11ecad6d00a098d6abfa:subsystem.PR_Channel2022_RH84_subsystem_291"
localhost kernel: caller is qla_nvme_post_cmd+0x216/0x1380 [qla2xxx]
localhost kernel: CPU: 6 PID: 75092 Comm: kworker/u129:4 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B W OE --------- --- 5.14.0-70.22.1.el9_0.x86_64+debug #1
localhost kernel: Hardware name: HPE ProLiant XL420 Gen10/ProLiant XL420 Gen10, BIOS U39 01/13/2022
localhost kernel: Workqueue: nvme-wq nvme_async_event_work [nvme_core]
localhost kernel: Call Trace:
localhost kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
localhost kernel: check_preemption_disabled+0xc8/0xd0
localhost kernel: qla_nvme_post_cmd+0x216/0x1380 [qla2xxx]
Use raw_smp_processor_id() instead of smp_processor_id().
Also use queue_work() across the driver instead of queue_work_on() thus
avoiding usage of smp_processor_id() when CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT is enabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix unsafe drain work queue code
If create_qp does not fully succeed it is possible for qp cleanup
code to attempt to drain the send or recv work queues before the
queues have been created causing a seg fault. This patch checks
to see if the queues exist before attempting to drain them. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jbd2: check 'jh->b_transaction' before removing it from checkpoint
Following process will corrupt ext4 image:
Step 1:
jbd2_journal_commit_transaction
__jbd2_journal_insert_checkpoint(jh, commit_transaction)
// Put jh into trans1->t_checkpoint_list
journal->j_checkpoint_transactions = commit_transaction
// Put trans1 into journal->j_checkpoint_transactions
Step 2:
do_get_write_access
test_clear_buffer_dirty(bh) // clear buffer dirty，set jbd dirty
__jbd2_journal_file_buffer(jh, transaction) // jh belongs to trans2
Step 3:
drop_cache
journal_shrink_one_cp_list
jbd2_journal_try_remove_checkpoint
if (!trylock_buffer(bh)) // lock bh, true
if (buffer_dirty(bh)) // buffer is not dirty
__jbd2_journal_remove_checkpoint(jh)
// remove jh from trans1->t_checkpoint_list
Step 4:
jbd2_log_do_checkpoint
trans1 = journal->j_checkpoint_transactions
// jh is not in trans1->t_checkpoint_list
jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail(journal) // trans1 is done
Step 5: Power cut, trans2 is not committed, jh is lost in next mounting.
Fix it by checking 'jh->b_transaction' before remove it from checkpoint. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/cma: Allow UD qp_type to join multicast only
As for multicast:
- The SIDR is the only mode that makes sense;
- Besides PS_UDP, other port spaces like PS_IB is also allowed, as it is
UD compatible. In this case qkey also needs to be set [1].
This patch allows only UD qp_type to join multicast, and set qkey to
default if it's not set, to fix an uninit-value error: the ib->rec.qkey
field is accessed without being initialized.
=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in cma_set_qkey drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:510 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in cma_make_mc_event+0xb73/0xe00 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:4570
cma_set_qkey drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:510 [inline]
cma_make_mc_event+0xb73/0xe00 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:4570
cma_iboe_join_multicast drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:4782 [inline]
rdma_join_multicast+0x2b83/0x30a0 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:4814
ucma_process_join+0xa76/0xf60 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1479
ucma_join_multicast+0x1e3/0x250 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1546
ucma_write+0x639/0x6d0 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1732
vfs_write+0x8ce/0x2030 fs/read_write.c:588
ksys_write+0x28c/0x520 fs/read_write.c:643
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline]
__ia32_sys_write+0xdb/0x120 fs/read_write.c:652
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:114 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0x96/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:180
do_fast_syscall_32+0x34/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:205
do_SYSENTER_32+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/entry/common.c:248
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x4d/0x5c
Local variable ib.i created at:
cma_iboe_join_multicast drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:4737 [inline]
rdma_join_multicast+0x586/0x30a0 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:4814
ucma_process_join+0xa76/0xf60 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1479
CPU: 0 PID: 29874 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
=====================================================
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-rdma/20220117183832.GD84788@nvidia.com/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: intel-ish-hid: Fix kernel panic during warm reset
During warm reset device->fw_client is set to NULL. If a bus driver is
registered after this NULL setting and before new firmware clients are
enumerated by ISHTP, kernel panic will result in the function
ishtp_cl_bus_match(). This is because of reference to
device->fw_client->props.protocol_name.
ISH firmware after getting successfully loaded, sends a warm reset
notification to remove all clients from the bus and sets
device->fw_client to NULL. Until kernel v5.15, all enabled ISHTP kernel
module drivers were loaded right after any of the first ISHTP device was
registered, regardless of whether it was a matched or an unmatched
device. This resulted in all drivers getting registered much before the
warm reset notification from ISH.
Starting kernel v5.16, this issue got exposed after the change was
introduced to load only bus drivers for the respective matching devices.
In this scenario, cros_ec_ishtp device and cros_ec_ishtp driver are
registered after the warm reset device fw_client NULL setting.
cros_ec_ishtp driver_register() triggers the callback to
ishtp_cl_bus_match() to match ISHTP driver to the device and causes kernel
panic in guid_equal() when dereferencing fw_client NULL pointer to get
protocol_name. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix kernel crash due to null io->bio
We should return when io->bio is null before doing anything. Otherwise, panic.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
RIP: 0010:__submit_merged_write_cond+0x164/0x240 [f2fs]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
f2fs_submit_merged_write+0x1d/0x30 [f2fs]
commit_checkpoint+0x110/0x1e0 [f2fs]
f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x9f7/0xf00 [f2fs]
? __pfx_issue_checkpoint_thread+0x10/0x10 [f2fs]
__checkpoint_and_complete_reqs+0x84/0x190 [f2fs]
? preempt_count_add+0x82/0xc0
? __pfx_issue_checkpoint_thread+0x10/0x10 [f2fs]
issue_checkpoint_thread+0x4c/0xf0 [f2fs]
? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xff/0x130
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50
</TASK> |
